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Vitalik Buterin pfp

Vitalik Buterin

Grats @dankrad @karalabe.eth you got me to interrupt my work on EIPs and make a twitter response that turned into an unscheduled poast 😀 https://vitalik.eth.limo/general/2024/05/17/decentralization.html

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Péter Szilágyi pfp

Péter Szilágyi

Thanks. In exchange let meg interrupt my shit-posting to write an EIP (brain-dump) :) https://x.com/peter_szilagyi/status/1791589527452336341

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Vitalik Buterin pfp

Vitalik Buterin

It's an interesting proposal! I think the biggest challenge with this kind of approach is intentional "edge attacks" to try to split the network. So, suppose you have X+1 proposer slots in a row. You send a tx right on a slot boundary, and don't include it X+1 times. Half the network thinks your last block is censoring

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Péter Szilágyi pfp

Péter Szilágyi

I'm unsure this is an attack though. If I am a malicious validator that try to mess with my own block, I could try and time the propagation to split the network, but the effect is that my block might get reorged out f 50%+ don't attest. If 50%+ does attest, the block remains. But I don't see a split here. 1/2

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Vitalik Buterin pfp

Vitalik Buterin

OK I thought about it more, and I think you're right; if it's a fork choice penalty, and not a validity rule, and there's an eventual convergence guarantee, then it seems like it could work. The main risk I see is accidental mempool splitting; the mempool contains lots of objects and if you disagree even on one...

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Péter Szilágyi pfp

Péter Szilágyi

That's why the "mandated" transaction set would only be a subset of the pool. Should be a subset that we'd be confident enough that is "stable" across peers. Need to think about what would make a reliable set where small dissonances aren't a relevant issue.

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Péter Szilágyi pfp

Péter Szilágyi

The proposal is a asymmetric in this regard. For normal validators, there is no harm in missing a transaction the others have. Finding "better paying ones" in a block is accepted. Is the block producer is missing a transaction, that's an issue. But only if 50%+ of the network has it. But then why did this one miss it?

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Vitalik Buterin pfp

Vitalik Buterin

The easiest way to make a reliable set is to assign one or a few actors per slot to each sign off on what they think the set is. ie. you can start from ILs, and start making the concept more and more aggressive, and from there I think we have an entire spectrum of options from "minimal IL" to "what you have in mind"

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Vitalik Buterin pfp

Vitalik Buterin

And a mempool-based forced inclusion approach has roughly the same issues with AA as ILs: you need in-protocol rules to determine when a tx is valid and fee paying.

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Vitalik Buterin pfp

Vitalik Buterin

This is why I think that ILs are the natural "stage 1", and make a good jumping-off point for more aggressive schemes (which I definitely support doing more research in to see if they are stable)

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ensgiant.eth 🎩 🆓

Please buy this Iconic ENS name @vitalik.eth

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