Vitalik Buterin
@vitalik.eth
Grats @dankrad @karalabe.eth you got me to interrupt my work on EIPs and make a twitter response that turned into an unscheduled poast 😀 https://vitalik.eth.limo/general/2024/05/17/decentralization.html
37 replies
266 recasts
1250 reactions
Péter Szilágyi
@karalabe.eth
Thanks. In exchange let meg interrupt my shit-posting to write an EIP (brain-dump) :) https://x.com/peter_szilagyi/status/1791589527452336341
2 replies
0 recast
8 reactions
Vitalik Buterin
@vitalik.eth
It's an interesting proposal! I think the biggest challenge with this kind of approach is intentional "edge attacks" to try to split the network. So, suppose you have X+1 proposer slots in a row. You send a tx right on a slot boundary, and don't include it X+1 times. Half the network thinks your last block is censoring
2 replies
1 recast
2 reactions
Péter Szilágyi
@karalabe.eth
I'm unsure this is an attack though. If I am a malicious validator that try to mess with my own block, I could try and time the propagation to split the network, but the effect is that my block might get reorged out f 50%+ don't attest. If 50%+ does attest, the block remains. But I don't see a split here. 1/2
2 replies
0 recast
1 reaction
Péter Szilágyi
@karalabe.eth
On the other hand, if it's not my block, then my proposal's "mining" order *is* actually the economically rational order. So a rational miner would not include it because it's mandated, but rather because that's what's economically meaningful, independent if they received the tx 12 or 13 or 9 seconds ago. 2/3
1 reply
0 recast
0 reaction
Vitalik Buterin
@vitalik.eth
OK I thought about it more, and I think you're right; if it's a fork choice penalty, and not a validity rule, and there's an eventual convergence guarantee, then it seems like it could work. The main risk I see is accidental mempool splitting; the mempool contains lots of objects and if you disagree even on one...
2 replies
0 recast
1 reaction
