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david pfp
david
@davidbr
some thoughts on % exit: if every dao spend proportionally reduces the exit value, sounds rational to exit before a large spend and rejoin after. perhaps difficult if holding many nouns, but makes sense if only holding one? assuming the dao has no significant income (like today). wdyt @w-g
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david pfp
david
@davidbr
unless there's a way to value illiquid assets e.g. ongoing proposals
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w-g
@w-g
Do agree that it points dao increasingly towards incremental spends (again more a function of reducing threshold) which I think is a good direction. Not sure if streaming payments can be reworked so that they debit the treasury/exit pool directly over time, for example. It also makes the risk of rug more bi-directional
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w-g pfp
w-g
@w-g
Isn’t this rightwise a discussion about quit/fork threshold rather than exit calc? Joel sort of made that point too. With any free/low-friction (o thresh) approach this is a game one can attempt to play. What happens, though, if 10 people all try to play the same game?
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Joel Cares pfp
Joel Cares
@joel
If Nouns are selling at or below book value I see this happening too. Perhaps it provides some downwards pressure on max proposal size, as larger spends incentivize more arb activity around this. Does make an interesting market game.
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