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w-g
@w-g
Slashing mechanism for Nouns: - deposit-to-propose (proportional to CI or size of ask, whichever larger) - proposal succeeds: deposit is reclaimed on queue - proposal fails: deposit enters a queue phase where anyone can vote to withhold. This vote is imo best if weighted by noun age (decentralized judiciary) and carries its own dynamic quorum curve (ie consensus required to slash can be as stringent as desired) motivation: -the carrot of pushing a malicious high cost prop is an ongoing existential risk to Nouns -proposal spam can quickly become a concern as supply expands, permissionless swapping grows in adoption, etc. -The current lever of increasing proposal threshold is undesirable since it generically slows gov speed at the expense of more centralization. It’s also useless in discouraging coordinated attacks -More good faith props from more unique voices is good! -low cost props are generally low risk (Likely protocol-change props require their own treatment)
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wiz
@wiz
def need some kind of slashing mechanism but i think it should be a redistribution of voting power
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w-g
@w-g
I have generally been treating 1 Noun = 1 Vote as sacred when thinking about gov upgrades .. in part because my sense is it’s still a popular aspect of protocol, possibly worth preserving for legitimacy, etc (like daily auction, for example), and I think in part because it’s good to have some boundaries somewhere to delineate thinking a bit. maybe a deeper reason.. I also tend to think of Nouns as blameless actors* in the protocol..they shouldn’t be slashed or burned because their custodians couldn’t figure shit out idk. *actors frfr
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