Content
@
0 reply
0 recast
0 reaction
w-g
@w-g
Slashing mechanism for Nouns: - deposit-to-propose (proportional to CI or size of ask, whichever larger) - proposal succeeds: deposit is reclaimed on queue - proposal fails: deposit enters a queue phase where anyone can vote to withhold. This vote is imo best if weighted by noun age (decentralized judiciary) and carries its own dynamic quorum curve (ie consensus required to slash can be as stringent as desired) motivation: -the carrot of pushing a malicious high cost prop is an ongoing existential risk to Nouns -proposal spam can quickly become a concern as supply expands, permissionless swapping grows in adoption, etc. -The current lever of increasing proposal threshold is undesirable since it generically slows gov speed at the expense of more centralization. It’s also useless in discouraging coordinated attacks -More good faith props from more unique voices is good! -low cost props are generally low risk (Likely protocol-change props require their own treatment)
2 replies
0 recast
3 reactions
Michael Gingras (lilfrog)
@frog
Agora is working on something like this for ENS. It’s called proposal bonds. You post a bond to put up a proposal, but folks can either 1. Approve 2. Reject and keep bond 3. Reject and return bond 3 exists so proposals don’t get pushed through bc we feel bad about someone losing a bunch of money through their bond.
2 replies
0 recast
2 reactions
w-g
@w-g
haha nice synchronicity that they reference Nouns sponsorship as an alternate paradigm! I definitely lean towards the bond as a healthier, more decentralized and ultimately imo much lower friction (ie overall much more governance access & with higher durability since can accommodate much lower proposal thresholds) mechanism. Tyvm for the link 🙏 (On your last point I guess I see returning as the norm in virtually all cases.. the reason for kicking the slashing decision to the noun age voting body is - since protection from economic majority attack is one of the primary benefits - we really need a judiciary which is high-alignment (yet distributed) to deter this sort of actor from ever getting started. Wonder if this will get brought up in the ENS thread
1 reply
0 recast
1 reaction
Michael Gingras (lilfrog)
@frog
Can you expand on your last point about economic majority attack? I’m a bit lost on that part. I’m glad you like it though!
1 reply
0 recast
1 reaction
w-g
@w-g
20% of supply is active and may be possible to push whatever one might want through governance with <15% of total supply, assuming not flagrant enough to trigger veto. With exit option, exploring this kind of attack is arguably good risk/reward. current veto stewards are very hesitant to use - even under existential duress - apparently because they consider it exerting too much central influence. Either way, simply the theoretical power to block a prop does not seem to be sufficient deterrent for a range of possible actors. so slashing is good- but the main concern is not trolls but sharks- so you need a judiciary otherwise might makes right
0 reply
0 recast
0 reaction
