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Elad
@el4d
Nouns Governor design challenge We found a bad attack vector, and don't love any of the mitigations. Please read and help us be smarter! (rounds.wtf starts tomorrow morning) https://mirror.xyz/verbsteam.eth/gnTdSqqiZC7OmqL8Dix-hEek5Sim1abC1BsZNm9_h-s
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w-g
@w-g
another q is whether to reframe the problem to include proposal spamming, which currently *is* exacerbated by permissionless swapping. I suppose depends whether part of the intended purpose of constraining a noun’s proposal rate is to constrain the owner’s proposal rate, or just to limit total simultaneous props
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Spencer Perkins
@spencerperkins.eth
Good point, but I think this is actually already a theoretical issue today, and I haven't seen it yet (?) Can create a prop, then transfer Nouns to another wallet and create another, so on... I.e I think this isn't necessarily new or exacerbated (transferring is easier than swapping)
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w-g
@w-g
! is this true? 😅 I always thought a noun with an active prop can’t be used again but thinking about it now I guess I see how that doesn’t make sense. So ofc agree, then, except insofar as there are/may be incentives (inside or outside protocol) to propose at the Noun level…eg w $nogs. IMO will have to be fixed eventually (not durable long term). The extreme failure mode is Nouns treasury could be pursued/fork forced with a min. quorum of nouns & > foundation reserves in a gas offensive (push thousands of successful props). Token pools like $⌐◨-◨ may then be more of a solution than a problem since they probably *increase* governance security (can disallow Nouns from being swapped/claimed that have pending props, votes etc as needed)
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