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Barnabé Monnot
@barnabe
A new post on everything ePBS, slot auctions, execution tickets, attester-proposer separation, preconfirmations and even PEPC! I propose an alternative mechanism, "APS-Burn", to execution tickets in order to achieve attester-proposer separation https://mirror.xyz/barnabe.eth/QJ6W0mmyOwjec-2zuH6lZb0iEI2aYFB9gE-LHWIMzjQ
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Ladislaus
@ladislaus
Great framing of the current APS landscape, thank you for that! When contrasting ETs vs APS-burn it appears to me that you value shielding validators from relays/mevboost completely (w/ ETs) *lower* compared to the abundance of added complexities due to ET (pricing) mechanisms (if APS-burn). Is this a fair assessment?
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Barnabé Monnot
@barnabe
Hmm i don’t think that’s the case though. If APS-Burn, validators are very passive with respect to pricing, they just confirm some bid floor à la mev-burn and take home some residual (hopefully a small one due to the auction being very early). Could also use a different auction model if we preferred
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Ladislaus
@ladislaus
Right, I needed to re-hash the bidding&attestation process in the original MEV-burn design, but see your tentative sympathy for APS-burn over ETs clearer now.
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Ladislaus
@ladislaus
Have to think about it more, but an overarching design question seems to be if we want the protocol to shield beacon proposers from the overhead of "selling" future blockspace (w/ ETs) or explicitly delegate this task to them (w/ APS-Burn)
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Barnabé Monnot
@barnabe
But we might still involve beacon proposers in terms of getting them to include ET-relevant transactions, it just feels explosive to let execution proposers (who are ET holders!) be responsible for inclusion there. I mention it a bit in the text too
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