A new post on everything ePBS, slot auctions, execution tickets, attester-proposer separation, preconfirmations and even PEPC! I propose an alternative mechanism, "APS-Burn", to execution tickets in order to achieve attester-proposer separation

A new post on everything ePBS, slot auctions, execution tickets, attester-proposer separation, preconfirmations and even PEPC! I propose an alternative mechanism, "APS-Burn", to execution tickets in order to achieve attester-proposer separation https://mirror.xyz/barnabe.eth/QJ6W0mmyOwjec-2zuH6lZb0iEI2aYFB9gE-LHWIMzjQ

Robust Incentives Group @ Ethereum Foundation

https://rig.ethereum.org

Great framing of the current APS landscape, thank you for that!

When contrasting ETs vs APS-burn it appears to me that you value shielding validators from relays/mevboost completely (w/ ETs) *lower* compared to the abundance of added complexities due to ET (pricing) mechanisms (if APS-burn). Is this a fair assessment?

Also, there's this neat memetic unfair advantage of permissionless lotteries.

Even if one argued ET-pools were to be a thing, I could envision a 'solo-staker gambler guild' purchasing ETs to then only redistribute building rights to either locally build payloads or decentralised builders (suave?).

Right, I needed to re-hash the bidding&attestation process in the original MEV-burn design, but see your tentative sympathy for APS-burn over ETs clearer now.

Hmm i don’t think that’s the case though. If APS-Burn, validators are very passive with respect to pricing, they just confirm some bid floor à la mev-burn and take home some residual (hopefully a small one due to the auction being very early). Could also use a different auction model if we preferred