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Barnabé Monnot pfp
Barnabé Monnot
@barnabe
A new post on everything ePBS, slot auctions, execution tickets, attester-proposer separation, preconfirmations and even PEPC! I propose an alternative mechanism, "APS-Burn", to execution tickets in order to achieve attester-proposer separation https://mirror.xyz/barnabe.eth/QJ6W0mmyOwjec-2zuH6lZb0iEI2aYFB9gE-LHWIMzjQ
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Ladislaus pfp
Ladislaus
@ladislaus
Great framing of the current APS landscape, thank you for that! When contrasting ETs vs APS-burn it appears to me that you value shielding validators from relays/mevboost completely (w/ ETs) *lower* compared to the abundance of added complexities due to ET (pricing) mechanisms (if APS-burn). Is this a fair assessment?
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Barnabé Monnot
@barnabe
Hmm i don’t think that’s the case though. If APS-Burn, validators are very passive with respect to pricing, they just confirm some bid floor à la mev-burn and take home some residual (hopefully a small one due to the auction being very early). Could also use a different auction model if we preferred
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Barnabé Monnot pfp
Barnabé Monnot
@barnabe
So yes in APS-Burn, validators/beacon proposers are only relevant as accidental leaders for the auction, but as tightly controlled ones. They don’t get to mess around the relay ecosystem at all either, this is the execution proposer’s purview
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Ladislaus pfp
Ladislaus
@ladislaus
Right, I needed to re-hash the bidding&attestation process in the original MEV-burn design, but see your tentative sympathy for APS-burn over ETs clearer now.
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