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Barnabé Monnot
@barnabe
A new post on everything ePBS, slot auctions, execution tickets, attester-proposer separation, preconfirmations and even PEPC! I propose an alternative mechanism, "APS-Burn", to execution tickets in order to achieve attester-proposer separation https://mirror.xyz/barnabe.eth/QJ6W0mmyOwjec-2zuH6lZb0iEI2aYFB9gE-LHWIMzjQ
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Ladislaus
@ladislaus
Great framing of the current APS landscape, thank you for that! When contrasting ETs vs APS-burn it appears to me that you value shielding validators from relays/mevboost completely (w/ ETs) *lower* compared to the abundance of added complexities due to ET (pricing) mechanisms (if APS-burn). Is this a fair assessment?
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Ladislaus
@ladislaus
Also, there's this neat memetic unfair advantage of permissionless lotteries. Even if one argued ET-pools were to be a thing, I could envision a 'solo-staker gambler guild' purchasing ETs to then only redistribute building rights to either locally build payloads or decentralised builders (suave?).
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Barnabé Monnot
@barnabe
I am more and more convinced that “purchasing ETs” will look a lot like “winning some mev auction” with extra steps, because the purchase action will induce MEV itself (what if a single ticket is sold at a posted price? who gets it then?)
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Ladislaus
@ladislaus
I have not come across a specific design proposal, yet. Intuitively I'd agree here. Do you refer to such a "mev auction" from a primary sale perspective on the protocol level or do you refer to the secondary market? (or both?)
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Barnabé Monnot
@barnabe
Mainly the primary sale, though yes the secondary sales could have their own dynamics (ticket pools might exist for instance)
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