Content
@
0 reply
0 recast
0 reaction
mert
@0xmert
can someone who understands this much better than me show me how restaking doesn't totally turn a decentralized system into a fragile one vulnerable to cascading risk
11 replies
1 recast
17 reactions
Daniel Fernandes
@dfern.eth
The long and short of it is that restaking is not the same as rehypothecation. Rehypothecation makes you vulnerable to market risk, which is an exogenous risk that you can't control. Slashing is an endogenous risk, it's 100% in your control not to sign two blocks at the same height.
7 replies
0 recast
10 reactions
kenny 🎩
@kenny
it's not 100% in control though because 1) most people delegate 2) a client bug could cause double signing even if you do everything properly (hence emphasis on "client diversity) there's always outside risk and the more things get restaked the more that risk will compound
1 reply
0 recast
0 reaction
Daniel Fernandes
@dfern.eth
Hmm, that's not how I would use 'control' definitionally. I mean 'control' as in 'agency'. You have 100% agency to take ownership or to delegate responsibility and take on principal agent risk. Running an anti-slasher over the top of any client protects you from client bugs, which is a smaller piece of code to audit
1 reply
0 recast
0 reaction
kenny 🎩
@kenny
smaller piece of code to audit but you could still do everything right in your power, mess up the audit, and double sign because of a missed bug 100% agency sure but 100% in your control not to double sign is different because it staking relies on a complex tech stack
1 reply
0 recast
0 reaction
Daniel Fernandes
@dfern.eth
Again, that is not how I use the word 'control'. A gamma ray could flip a bit in my computer and publish my private key but I don't spend time worrying about that, or claim that the computer is not in my control.
1 reply
0 recast
0 reaction
kenny 🎩
@kenny
we're talking large degrees of difference in the likelihood a gamma ray messes with your computer exposing a private key vs something goes wrong with a proof of stake mechanism with a history of a little over a year of liveness
1 reply
0 recast
0 reaction
Daniel Fernandes
@dfern.eth
Yeah, perhaps that's our difference here. I asset that it's not, if we can't do basic file storage and retreival, we should just give up on computing as a field of inquiry. You can write 100 anti-slashers and check they concur & there is a 10^100 larger chance that the protocol validator set 'inactivity leaks' you out.
1 reply
0 recast
0 reaction
