Henry de Valence on Warpcast

Janmajaya Mall pfp

Checkout my demo of Oblivious message retrieval (OMR) - https://github.com/Janmajayamall/ObliviousMessageRetrieval. If you find this interesting then let's work together :) 1/n

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Janmajaya Mall pfp

What's OMR ? It's a way for an untrusted server to send you pertaining messages/transactions from set of all messages without ever learning which ones actually do! 2/n

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Janmajaya Mall pfp

It's very useful for privacy focussed blockchains / messaging apps, since it allows mobile/light clients to receive latest messages pertaining to them without trusting servers. You can learn more about OMR on readme of github link above. 3/n

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Janmajaya Mall pfp

I am working on implementing OMR for wide adoption so that privacy focussed app/blockchain users don't have to trust servers! The implementation linked above isn't quite there yet, but I am working on improving it! For ex - adding SIMD support for underlying fhe library - https://github.com/Janmajayamall/fhe.rs 4/n

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Henry de Valence pfp

Henry de Valence

what are the key sizes like?

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Janmajaya Mall pfp

the detection key uploaded to server by client is of size 20.2 MB.

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Henry de Valence pfp

Henry de Valence

wow, that’s a big improvement over the original paper. what are the sizes of the clue keys / clues? for penumbra we went with fmd because the clue key can be just 32 bytes, so we can include them in every address and the anonymity set is the whole userbase, rather than just the people using detection

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Janmajaya Mall pfp

Thanks! clue keys = 133kb and clues = 956 bytes (both same as paper). I haven't done anything new with detection key. Just reduced the polynomial size of ciphertexts from 2^15 to 2^11. This reduces evaluation time of messages by a lot but also reduces no. of messages that can be processed on a single core at once...

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Janmajaya Mall pfp

...however we can always increase no. of cores to accommodate more traffic. Yeah, I understand that having 133kb clue key isn't ideal for blockchains. I think authors of OMR paper are in the process of integrating OMR with Zcash. Curious to see how they approach it.

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Henry de Valence pfp

Henry de Valence

will be interesting to see. my instinct is that in practice, probabilistic privacy relative to the entire userbase will end up being better than stronger guarantees relative to a small subset who opt in to using the system, which is why we went for FMD

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Henry de Valence pfp

Henry de Valence

like once you have a clue key in every address, you can have clues in every transaction, regardless of whether or not the sender or receiver actually use the detection system

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Janmajaya Mall pfp

yeah this makes sense. But we can experiment with both approaches and figure out what works best. I am working on implementing this for Aztec. So we likely have some data on how FMD compares with OMR in blockchain context.

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Henry de Valence pfp

Henry de Valence

neat, what’s the basic shape of the integration? are clues going to be bundled into transactions, or just posted to a separate scanning layer? how does the address <> clue key lookup work?

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Janmajaya Mall pfp

Haven't thought of better way for address <> clue key lookup than naively posting on the internet. If there's some progress, will keep you updated! Current hope is to bundle clues with transactions, but it's still early to confirm this.

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Henry de Valence pfp

Henry de Valence

hmm, can an attacker do anything by interfering with the address/clue key resolution? would it make sense to have something like a merklized transparency log of the clue keys? or, if the clue keys are subordinate to the address, can they be signed by the address and verified that way?

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Henry de Valence pfp

Henry de Valence

also, in OMR, is the clue key tied to the detection parameters at all? can the false positive rate be controlled independently of the clue keys?

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Janmajaya Mall pfp

by interfering with resolution of lookup the attacker can make the message go to some other user ~ to which the resolved clue key belongs. So an attacker can spam an individual, or a group, by resolving most lookups to their clue keys. Since OMR caps msgs that can be pertinent to a user at once to max value(ex. 50)...

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