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Anders Elowsson pfp
Anders Elowsson
@anderselowsson
🧵 Rainbow roles & incentives: ABPS + FOCILR + AS This post explores the limits of a maximally unbundled staking set, examining potential rainbow roles and the incentive designs required to coordinate them. It presents three unbundling mechanisms: https://ethresear.ch/t/rainbow-roles-incentives-abps-focilr-as/21826
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Anders Elowsson pfp
Anders Elowsson
@anderselowsson
Attester–beacon proposer separation (ABPS) Enforces a target proportion of beacon proposers relative to attesters. A deviation from the target causes a proposer fee adjustment, incentivizing stakers to join or leave until balance is restored. The MEV is burned at the macro level.
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Anders Elowsson
@anderselowsson
FOCIL with ranked transactions (FOCILR) Rewards FOCIL includers and ensures proposers include appropriate txs from the IL aggregate when the block is full, strengthening censorship resistance. Advanced block stuffing strategies are prevented through collective includer incentives.
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Anders Elowsson
@anderselowsson
Attester separation (AS) Attesters to the available chain and the finality gadget can be split into separate roles, and the post analyzes the consensus implications. It then explores the use of separate reward curves or relative reward curves to incentivize the two roles.
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Anders Elowsson pfp
Anders Elowsson
@anderselowsson
Two possible rainbow constellations from unbundling are shown here. The left pane features ABPS + FOCILR, with proposer and includer fees determined by a DPA (see below). The right pane incorporates AS and utilizes multiple reward curves.
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Anders Elowsson pfp
Anders Elowsson
@anderselowsson
The dynamic pricing auction (DPA) for ABPS works similarly to EIP-1559, adjusting the fee to maintain a target proportion of beacon proposers. The plot illustrates how quickly the fee changes under a moderate setting, depending on the deviation from the target.
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Anders Elowsson pfp
Anders Elowsson
@anderselowsson
If Ethereum adopts a missed proposal penalty under ABPS and the MEV falls, it may be necessary to allow for negative fees (a reward). A t-bounded DPA can then be adopted, which converges at some threshold t that differs from 0.
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Anders Elowsson pfp
Anders Elowsson
@anderselowsson
Multiple reward curves can also be used for incentivizing roles. The first example is to use separate reward curves. As illustrated, given that the supply of stakers willing to assume the different roles is unknown and may vary, relative proportions may diverge under equilibrium.
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Anders Elowsson pfp
Anders Elowsson
@anderselowsson
If the relative proportion of stakers in two roles is important, the protocol can instead use a relative reward curve (RRC). For AS, a standard reward curve can be used for finality attesters, while an RRC determines the yield for stakers who are only available-chain attesters.
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