Question to the Ethereum magicians out there: is there a realistically feasible way to incentivize client diversity on the protocol layer?
E.g lower rewards for validators using a client above a critical threshold

I make my computer do all sorts of goofy things.

I don’t think you can find a Sybil-resistant mechanism unfortunately :( if you could, it would be amazing to incentivise decentralisation ofc, but you might need other primitives like identity tied with verifiable compute and other assumptions that wouldn’t be palatable to have at L1-level

It’s very hard to even understand if there is a single entity behind many Sybil nodes, but in a way we can design incentives that invite you to not use the same client as many other stakers do (that’s in protocol already with correlated rewards)

It’s very hard to even understand if there is a single entity behind many Sybil nodes, but in a way we can design incentives that invite you to not use the same client as many other stakers do (that’s in protocol already with correlated rewards) https://warpcast.com/barnabe/0x114d6131