My first essay in a long time. 

Curious what Farcaster has to say on that matter.

My first essay in a long time. 

Curious what Farcaster has to say on that matter.

https://kanfa.macbudkowski.com/speculation-market-fit-trap

when designing MolochV1, tokens were intentionally left out, reaction to 2017 

difficult to sustain - Hotel California effect

now thinking of ways to de-couple speculation from initial/early distribution

Building @kiwi 
Writing @ https://kanfa.macbudkowski.com/

when designing MolochV1, tokens were intentionally left out, reaction to 2017 

difficult to sustain - Hotel California effect

now thinking of ways to de-couple speculation from initial/early distribution

https://warpcast.com/jamesyoung/0xa75b8a

Can you say more about the specific Hotel California effect in this situation?

DAO governance is responsibility

MolochV1 was purely grant giving, no “reward” which was the intention but led to decreased engagement over time

even with “rage quit”, the social obligation felt like you can never leave - you don’t want to let others down

some “social DAOs” of V1 era are now sunsetting

Highly curated news & content for web3 builders. New link every 4 hours. All links handpicked by the Kiwi community.

https://kiwinews.xyz/

are there any “rewards”

FYI one of the better visualization tools

are there any “rewards”

FYI one of the better visualization tools 

https://machinations.io/

Interesting. I feel like we have the same issue with @kiwi. It‘s mostly obligation and we argue that „by getting voting rights you gain curation power.“ But our token holders cannot defect (ragequit) and they also don‘t earn rewards (unless they actually really work for us, then they get cashflow share).