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Cây Thúi
@chicken
The Rollup: Why The Intent-Centric Future Is Extremely Promising with Anoma W/: Adrian Brink - co-founder Anoma, discussing: > Security guarantees of intent-based systems > How this play into the chain abstracted future > He discuss the concept of generalizable intents and explore his vision for the intent-centric future.
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Chi
@chivnt
😍 😍 😍
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Cá Ba Sa
@cabasa
latest industry report, covering the state of the market, current narratives, individual coalition member updates, and more.
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Soda
@soda
tldr: Decent chance people overindexed on value properties of L1 tokens (ETH in this example) instead of technical complexity/ inadvertent moats that came from interop challenges
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Kinh Ba
@kinh3
The AMM space has evolved since MEV extraction started to encroach on DeFi. Uniswap V3 pioneered liquidity concentration to help LPs earn more fees but this feature requires active monitoring. As MEV is brokered offchain through MEV-Boost, and most LPs passively provide liquidity onchain, LPs keep getting burned.
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Tuổi Trẻ Cười
@tuoitrecuoi
Loss-Versus-Rebalancing is a term used to describe MEV lost through arbitrage as a result of LPs offering stale prices. As AMM prices update slower than CEXs, LPs become exposed to losses when arbitrageurs correct the discrepancy. LVR accounts for most MEV extraction on Ethereum.
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Emmauel
@vinhtuong
In the 2022 paper Automated Market Making and Loss-Versus-Rebalancing, Columbia University professor and a16z researcher Tim Roughgarden found that arbitrage costs ETH-USDC LPs about 11% of their principal per year.
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@dtmyxuyenst
MEV losses are frequently associated with swappers because most retail DeFi users interact with DEXs to execute swaps. But passive LPs collectively account for the biggest losses in today’s MEV landscape because they offer stale prices and lose out on fees to searchers, builders, and proposers (and they need these fees to maintain profitability).
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Pravas
@khet
Arbitrageurs search for price discrepancies between a CEX and DEX or two pools. When a user makes an order, the arbitrageur buys or sells the asset at a better price offered elsewhere then swaps into the price offered by LPs in the pool. This means they profit from the price difference and LPs get burned.
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@bronu
Just-in-Time liquidity attackers (also known as sandwich LP attackers) search for large swap orders and add liquidity to the pool then remove it immediately after the swap. The user benefits from a lower price impact and the attacker earns pool fees, while LPs lose out on revenue. In this case, the attackers “sandwich” liquidity provision rather than the swap and LPs get burned.
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85cent
@salonpas
Sandwich attackers search for large swap orders and frontrun them ahead of the user. As a result, the user’s slippage increases and they get a worse price. The attacker then backruns the order and pockets the difference—their transactions “sandwich” the order to extract a profit and the user gets burned.
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Du Tho
@dutho
On AMMs, MEV is typically extracted through sandwich attacks and arbitrage (lending protocols also leak a type of MEV known as OEV during liquidation events).
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Vét Láp
@vestlab
Searchers extract MEV in between Ethereum blocks. Most MEV gets leaked on L1, where new blocks are produced much slower than L2.
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Ca Non
@canon
When searchers extract MEV, they bribe builders to get their transaction added to blocks and builders bribe proposers to get their blocks added to the chain. Each of these actors profits from users when MEV gets leaked.
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@guop
As MEV incentivized proposers to reorder blocks for their own gain, the MEV research team Flashbots implemented Proposer Builder Separation (PBS) for Ethereum through MEV-Boost. With this infrastructure, builders offer blocks and proposers add them to the chain. About 90% of Ethereum blocks are proposed through MEV-Boost today.
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iguverse
@iguverse.eth
DEXs then attracted arbitrageurs who were incentivized to balance prices between pools and lending platforms attracted liquidators who were incentivized to close underwater positions. This created MEV and the extractors became known as searchers.
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Vien Tin
@vientin
When DeFi emerged, retail swappers and LPs became the first DEX users. Lenders and borrowers, meanwhile, bootstrapped lending protocols.
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