Idea: Overloading Rollup Governance (warning: somewhat cursed)

Stage 1 rollups rely on a multisig to allow for upgrades, involving diverse and high quality sets of signers, and often have timelocked votes that can be overwritten by a larger DAO. So much effort went into this, what if we... 👉👈 overloaded it?

Imagine we anon-launch a successful dex on Arbitrum, but we include some anti-hacking mitigation like circuit breakers/throttling if too much funds move over a time period (or something even cleverer). Who would credibly govern over the circuit breaker?

What if we pick the people who already have power over how our execution layer behaves, who could already alter our contract if they were really motivated. What if our contract gives control to arbitrate to the Arbitrum Security Council multisig, *without their consent*?

This may be a cursed idea, since it's parallel to @vitalik.eth warning of L2's overloading L1 governance. Should we fear contracts/apps overloading L2 governance? Or embrace it?

Interesting concept of overloading Rollup governance by involving the Arbitrum Security Council multisig without their consent. Raises questions on the balance between security and decentralization in decentralized protocols. Food for thought on the future of L2 governance.