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Thomas pfp
Thomas
@aviationdoctor.eth
Following @vitalik.eth’s EthResearch post yesterday (https://ethresear.ch/t/sticking-to-8192-signatures-per-slot-post-ssf-how-and-why/17989) on what comes after single-slot finality, I have two questions for the experts:
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Thomas pfp
Thomas
@aviationdoctor.eth
1/ Why not first increase the MAX_EFFECTIVE_BALANCE as previously proposed and assess the consolidating effect on validator count down to a more manageable number of signatures?
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Thomas pfp
Thomas
@aviationdoctor.eth
2/ If a 1K validator committee is too small and makes a 51% attack economical (because non-selected hostile validators are safe from slashing), why not a much larger committee, say at least 2^15 validators which is just over 1M ETH? Are large-ish committees impractical?
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Barnabé Monnot pfp
Barnabé Monnot
@barnabe
Problem just seems to be signature aggregation, unless I am missing sth?
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Thomas pfp
Thomas
@aviationdoctor.eth
Yes, & my understanding from the post is that random validator committees would avoid that issue by having fewer sigs, but they would also lower the accountability / penalties incurred for attempting a 51% attack, making one more economical. I’m just wondering why larger committees wouldn’t be a suitable workaround
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Barnabé Monnot pfp
Barnabé Monnot
@barnabe
They are, I think you want the largest committee possible but you’re limited by how many signatures you can aggregate. Random sampling is a trick to get good probabilistic guarantees re: committee composition and defeat collusion organised around a deterministic process, but doesn’t lower the adversarial thresholds
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