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A Farcaster Exclusive
The Day America Sold Its Soul: How NAFTA Shattered the American Dream
Thirty-one years ago, in December 1993, Bill Clinton signed the North American Free Trade Agreement into law. The ceremony was grand, attended by former presidents, with Clinton declaring that “NAFTA means jobs. American jobs, and good-paying American jobs”. It was political theatre masquerading as economic policy, and it marked the precise moment when America began its descent from industrial superpower to a nation where dreams go to die.
The numbers tell a story of national betrayal. NAFTA caused the loss of approximately 700,000 jobs as production moved to Mexico, with 61% of these losses, 415,000 jobs, concentrated in relatively high-paying manufacturing positions. But these sterile statistics obscure a more profound truth: NAFTA shattered the foundational promise of American life, that hard work in honest industries would provide a pathway to prosperity.
The devastation was swift and merciless. Manufacturing employment collapsed by 26%, from 16.8 million jobs at the end of 1993 to 12.4 million at the end of 2016. States that had built their identities around making things, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, watched their industrial hearts ripped out. Manufacturing industries were responsible for 78% of the net jobs lost under NAFTA, totalling 686,700 manufacturing jobs.
The majority of workers displaced by NAFTA were relocated to the service industry, where average wages are just four-fifths of manufacturing sector pay. Families that had spent generations building middle-class lives through industrial work suddenly found themselves serving coffee or stocking shelves for poverty wages. The Labour Department reports that two in five manufacturing workers who lost jobs and were rehired experienced wage reductions, with one in six suffering cuts of more than 20%, an annual loss of at least $8,200.
The architect of this disaster was Bill Clinton, who “fundamentally reoriented the Democratic Party from being the party of the working class and middle class to being a party that actually fought to compete with the Republicans for Wall Street’s favour”. This was a deliberate choice to prioritise corporate profits over American workers.
Clinton’s administration was stuffed with Wall Street operatives who stood to gain enormously from NAFTA’s passage. Key appointees such as Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, Commerce Secretary Ron Brown and Deputy National Security Advisor Sandy Berger came from Wall Street finance houses or corporate law firms whose clients would benefit enormously from new protections for foreign investment and liberalisation of the Mexican financial sector.
The contempt for American workers was palpable. Clinton’s promise that “NAFTA will create a million jobs in the first five years” was literally a placeholder number accidentally left in the speech, a fitting metaphor for how little genuine consideration was given to working families’ welfare.
The business community mounted an unprecedented propaganda campaign to sell this betrayal to the American people. More than 100,000 pieces of promotional material were distributed in 1993, including state-by-state analyses of NAFTA’s economic impact circulated to each member of Congress. Corporations weaponised their own workforces, getting their workers, retirees, stockholders and suppliers to write Congress in support of NAFTA, with company appeals going out in employee paychecks.
The White House actively coordinated this corporate assault on democracy. Clinton’s aides used campaign contributor lists to identify large donors with business interests in NAFTA, then asked them to lobby lawmakers they had previously backed. This was corporate capture of the democratic process.
NAFTA was the blueprint for a new form of economic colonialism. NAFTA served as the template for rules of the emerging global economy, in which the benefits would flow to capital and the costs to labour. The agreement included provisions giving multinational corporations the right to sue governments for infringement of “investment rights”, essentially allowing companies to override democratic governance when it interfered with profit maximisation.
This established the fundamental principle that would govern American economic policy for the next three decades: U.S. corporations could relocate production elsewhere and sell back into the United States, undermining the bargaining power of American workers. The social contract that built the middle class, that companies had obligations to the communities that sustained them, was formally dissolved.
The consequences extended far beyond economics. NAFTA represented a fundamental rupture in American society. For generations, the promise of America was simple: work hard, play by the rules, and you could build a better life for your family. Manufacturing jobs were the engine of that promise, providing good wages, health benefits, and pension security to workers without university degrees.
The agreements traded away the interests of American workers in favour of American corporations eager to produce for the U.S. market at wages Americans can’t live on. The result was predictable: twenty years of stagnant wages, the upward redistribution of income and wealth, and the hollowing out of communities across the industrial heartland.
Today, we live with the consequences of Clinton’s betrayal. More than 980,000 specific American jobs have been certified as lost to NAFTA outsourcing under just one narrow government programme that undercounts the damage. Entire communities have been devastated. The rust belt cities that once symbolised American industrial might now stand as monuments to corporate treachery and political cowardice.
NAFTA directly cost the United States a net loss of 700,000 jobs, turned the trade surplus with Mexico into a chronic deficit, and increased the flow of undocumented workers into the United States, the exact opposite of every promise made to secure its passage.
NAFTA destroyed faith in the American system itself. It proved that the game was rigged, that the Democratic Party had abandoned its core constituency, and that the promises of politicians were worth precisely nothing when measured against corporate campaign contributions.
The American Dream didn’t die of natural causes, it was murdered by Bill Clinton and his corporate accomplices in December 1993. 0 reply
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A Farcaster Exclusive
How France’s Mandate System Created the Modern Syrian State
As Syria emerges from over half a century of Assad family rule, it’s crucial to understand the colonial foundations that shaped this troubled nation. While France did indeed play a decisive role in creating modern Syria’s borders and governmental structures, the claim that France “installed Hafez al-Assad as dictator” fundamentally misunderstands both the timeline and the complex political forces that brought the Assad dynasty to power.
The French Creation of Syria
France’s role in creating Syria was indeed profound and consequential. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, France was assigned the League of Nations mandate for Syria and Lebanon on September 29, 1923, which included the territory of present-day Lebanon and Alexandretta in addition to modern Syria. This represented the implementation of the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement between Britain and France, which had divided Ottoman territories between the colonial powers even before the war’s end.
France originally planned to establish three sectarian states: an Alawi state in the north, a Sunni Muslim state at the center, and a Druze state in the south, with the three eventually to be incorporated into a federal Syria. This divide-and-rule strategy reflected French colonial thinking that sought to prevent unified resistance by exploiting religious and ethnic divisions.
The artificial nature of Syria’s creation cannot be overstated. Politically, “Syria” acquired a narrower meaning after Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan had been detached from geographical Syria. France carved up the natural geographic and cultural unit of Greater Syria, creating borders that served French interests rather than reflecting organic political or social realities on the ground.
The French mandatory administration carried out much constructive work, roads were built, town planning was carried out, urban amenities were improved, land tenure was reformed in some districts, and agriculture was encouraged. The University of Damascus was established, with its teaching being mainly in Arabic. Yet these modernisation efforts came at the cost of political autonomy and were designed to serve French strategic interests in the region.
Syrian Resistance and the Struggle for Independence
From the beginning, Syrian society rejected French rule. The conclusions of the Permanent Mandates Commission confirmed the opposition of Syrians to the mandate in their country as well as to the Balfour Declaration, and their demand for a unified Greater Syria encompassing Palestine. This resistance was deeply cultural and religious, as Syrians saw French rule as an affront to their Islamic identity and Arab nationalism.
The most significant challenge to French rule came in 1925. A revolt in Jabal Al-Durūz, sparked by local grievances, led to an alliance between the Druze rebels and the nationalists of Damascus. For a time the rebels controlled much of the countryside, and in October 1925, bands entered the city of Damascus itself, leading to a two-day bombardment by the French.
Despite French attempts to maintain control by encouraging sectarian divisions and isolating urban and rural areas, the revolt spread from the countryside and united Syrian Druze, Sunnis, Shiites, Alawis, and Christians. This unity across sectarian lines demonstrated that French divide-and-rule tactics could not permanently suppress Syrian nationalism.
The French military responded with brutal counter-insurgency techniques that prefigured those that would be used later in Algeria and Indo-China, including house demolitions, collective punishments of towns, executions, population transfers, and the use of heavy armor in urban neighborhoods. The revolt was eventually subdued in 1926-27 via French aerial bombardment of civilian areas, including Damascus.
The End of French Rule and Syrian Independence
Pressured from Syrian nationalists and the British forces, France evacuated their troops on April 17, 1946, which marked the creation of the new, independent Syrian republic. France’s departure left behind a country with artificial borders, weak institutions, and deep sectarian divisions that had been both exploited and exacerbated by colonial rule.
The post-independence period was marked by extraordinary political instability. Between 1949 and 1963, senior officers engaged in countless military coups, there were three alone in 1949. This chaos reflected the fundamental weakness of the state structures France had created, which lacked legitimacy among the Syrian people and were ill-suited to governing a diverse, fractured society.
The Assad Rise
This is where historical accuracy becomes crucial. Hafez al-Assad came to power not through French installation, but through a complex series of internal Syrian power struggles that occurred decades after French withdrawal.
The Ba’th Party was formed in 1947 as a reaction against Western colonialism and capitalism, aiming to combat Western colonialism and promote Arab nationalism. The party gained strength in the politically tumultuous Syria that emerged after independence from France in 1946.
Following a series of short-lived regimes and the dissolution of the United Arab Republic in 1961, the Ba’thists took control after a coup in March 1963. Assad, an Alawite from the coastal mountains, gradually accumulated power within the Ba’th Party structure through his control of the air force and later as defense minister.
Only when Assad successfully carried out a bloodless coup on November 13, 1970 did the rivalries end. It was Syria’s tenth military coup in seventeen years. This coup, which Assad termed the “Corrective Revolution,” was orchestrated by Assad exploiting the rivalry between the Marxist-socialist and nationalist factions within the party, ousting the existing leadership.
By 1970, twenty-four years after French withdrawal, Assad had consolidated power entirely through Syrian political mechanisms, exploiting the institutional weaknesses and sectarian divisions that France had indeed created, but doing so as a Syrian actor pursuing Syrian power, not as a French agent.
France’s Unintended Legacy
The tragedy is that France’s colonial policies created many of the conditions that enabled Assad’s rise and consolidation of power. Assad used the secular Ba’th party as a cover for installing the Alawite minority into important positions throughout the special forces, intelligence and armored corps. This sectarian approach to power echoed the French colonial strategy of privileging minority groups to maintain control.
The artificial borders France created also played a role in Syria’s subsequent instability. The truncated Syria that emerged from French rule lacked the natural economic resources and geographic coherence of Greater Syria, making it dependent on external powers and vulnerable to internal divisions.
France’s infrastructure investments and administrative structures, while modernising in some respects, were designed to serve colonial extraction rather than indigenous development. The University of Damascus and road networks were real achievements, but they served a system designed to maintain French influence rather than foster genuine Syrian self-determination.
The Continuing Relevance of Colonial Legacy
As Syria attempts to rebuild after the Assad era, understanding France’s historical role remains vital. The sectarian divisions that Assad exploited and deepened were not primordial features of Syrian society, they were political constructs that were institutionalised and weaponized first by French colonial administrators and later by Syrian dictators.
The weakness of Syrian state institutions, which made military coups possible and authoritarian rule necessary for maintaining order, can be traced directly to the French mandate period. France created a state that could govern but could not represent, that could extract resources but could not build consensus, that could maintain order but could not foster legitimacy.
Conclusion
Today’s Syria faces the monumental task of overcoming both colonial legacies and decades of Assad rule. The sectarian divisions that France institutionalised and Assad weaponised must be transcended through inclusive governance structures. The weak institutions that enabled military coups must be strengthened through democratic accountability. The artificial borders that created regional instability must be managed through cooperative regional arrangements.
France, for its part, has a responsibility to acknowledge the harmful long-term consequences of its colonial policies while supporting Syrian efforts at genuine self-determination. This means backing inclusive political processes rather than sectarian proxies, supporting institution-building rather than strongmen, and respecting Syrian sovereignty rather than pursuing French interests.
The story of French-Syrian relations is the complex tale of how colonial boundaries and institutions created conditions of instability that Syrian actors then navigated, exploited, and perpetuated according to their own logic and interests. Understanding this complexity is essential for avoiding both the simplistic narratives that obscure historical responsibility and the deterministic thinking that denies Syrian agency.
As Syria writes its next chapter, it must grapple honestly with both its colonial inheritance and its own choices. Only by understanding how France shaped the Syrian state, without installing its eventual dictator, can Syrians build institutions that serve their own interests rather than the legacies of foreign rule.
References
1. Hafez al-Assad Biography
2. Current Affairs - Post Assad
3. French Syria (1919-1946), DADM Project
4. Council on Foreign Relations - Remembering Hafez al-Assad 0 reply
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About “Madonna” 1/1 offchain available as an ERC721 onchain. Exhibited during NFT NYC.
Madonna is the classic portrait of the Renaissance. She invites the chaos of revolution, appearing as a figure in the background. Throughout history, Madonna has taken many forms. Qualities of motherhood, nurture, care, and femininity give her an aura that has often been perceived as divine. The close proximity between the archetype of the Virgin and that of La Mona Lisa is intended to connect the virtue of being a woman in times when patriarchy led the change, particularly through their shared roles as mothers.
To reimagine what a modern Madonna could be on the blockchain, the veil was fundamental, symbolizing the protection of purity and genuine humble beginnings. The gaze matches the green veil to create cohesiveness with the collection and the two other portraits. The intention of a modern Madonna is to witness a historical shift, transforming from a figure often behind the scenes, the muse of the arts, into the patroness of the arts herself. 0 reply
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Farcaster Exclusive:
1/3 - Ali Shariati: The Revolutionary Who Awakened a Generation
The Intellectual Revolutionary Who Changed the Course of History
In the pantheon of revolutionary thinkers who shaped the modern Middle East, few figures loom as large or as tragically as Dr. Ali Shariati. Born in 1933 in the dusty village of Mazinan in northeastern Iran, this sociologist, philosopher, and revolutionary intellectual would become what many consider the true architect of Iran’s 1979 Revolution, a man whose ideas ignited the consciousness of an entire generation, yet who died under mysterious circumstances just two years before witnessing the fruition of his life’s work.
Shariati’s story is one of intellectual brilliance meeting revolutionary passion, of ancient Islamic traditions being reforged in the fires of modern resistance movements. He was, in the words of scholar Ervand Abrahamian, “the main ideologue of the Iranian Revolution”, a man who accomplished what many thought impossible: synthesising Marxist sociology with Shi’ite theology, creating a revolutionary Islam that spoke to the oppressed masses while challenging both Western imperialism and clerical conservatism.
The Making of a Revolutionary Mind
The seeds of Shariati’s revolutionary consciousness were planted early. His father, Mohammad-Taqi Shariati, was a progressive Islamic scholar who established the Centre for the Propagation of Islamic Truths in Mashhad, an institution that became deeply involved in Iran’s oil nationalisation movement of the 1950s. This early exposure to the intersection of religion and politics would profoundly shape the younger Shariati’s worldview.
At the Teacher’s Training College in Mashhad, Shariati encountered poverty for the first time, witnessing the hardships of Iran’s disadvantaged youth. This experience, combined with his voracious reading of Western philosophical and political thought, created a unique intellectual synthesis. As a young teacher in 1952, he founded the Islamic Students’ Association, an act of defiance that led to his first arrest and set the pattern for a life of principled resistance.
The pivotal transformation came during his five years in Paris (1959-1964), where he pursued his doctorate at the Sorbonne under the supervision of Iranologist Gilbert Lazard. But Shariati’s true education occurred outside the classroom, in the revolutionary ferment of a city that had become the epicenter of anticolonial movements. He collaborated with the Algerian National Liberation Front, was arrested during a demonstration honouring Patrice Lumumba, and immersed himself in the works of Jean-Paul Sartre, Frantz Fanon, and Che Guevara.
This period fundamentally altered Shariati’s understanding of Islam’s potential as a force for liberation. Under the tutelage of renowned orientalists like Louis Massignon and Jacques Berque, he began to see how revolutionary theory could be translated into the cultural symbols and religious language that Iranian masses could understand and embrace.
The Genesis of Red Shiism
Shariati’s revolutionary breakthrough came with his radical reinterpretation of Shi’ite history and theology. In his groundbreaking lectures at Tehran’s Husseinieh Ershad from 1967 to 1972, he articulated a vision that would electrify Iran’s youth and fundamentally alter the trajectory of Iranian politics.
Central to his thought was the distinction between what he termed “Red Shiism” and “Black Shiism”, a dichotomy that went to the heart of his revolutionary project. Red Shiism, according to Shariati, represented the authentic, revolutionary spirit of Islam as embodied by Imam Ali and his son Hussein. This was a religion of resistance, of standing with the oppressed against their oppressors, of martyrdom in the service of justice. Black Shiism, by contrast, was the institutionalised, conservative religion of the Safavid period and its clerical inheritors, a tool of social control that encouraged passive mourning rather than active resistance.
As scholar Rebecca Ruth Gould notes, Shariati “reconstructed the entire history of Islam and highlighted the revolutionary aspects of Shia history and thought, emphasising the fact that social justice and equality were inherent values in Shia Islam”. This wasn’t merely theological innovation; it was ideological revolution wrapped in religious language that ordinary Iranians could understand and internalise.
The Husseinieh Ershad Phenomenon
The Husseinieh Ershad, a non-traditional religious institute established in 1968, became the crucible where Shariati’s ideas reached their full flowering. Unlike traditional mosques, this venue in an upper-class Tehran neighborhood attracted an educated, questioning audience of primarily university students from Iran’s expanding urban areas. Here, Shariati delivered what would become some of the most influential lectures in modern Iranian history.
The impact was extraordinary. As contemporary observer Ervand Abrahamian documented, “Tapes of his lectures were widely circulated and received instant acclaim, especially among college and high school students. Shari’ati’s message ignited enthusiastic interest among the young generation of the discontented intelligentsia”. His audience grew from hundreds to thousands, with young people eagerly buying his books, attending his lectures, and distributing recordings throughout Iran’s cities and towns.
What made Shariati’s message so powerful was its unique synthesis of seemingly contradictory elements. As one analysis from the Tehran Bureau notes, Shariati’s ideology “meant they could be leftists, to stand up for social justice and rail against exploitation, colonialism and imperialism, and remain a devout Shia Muslim at the same time”. This was revolutionary Islam that spoke the language of both Marx and Muhammad, of both Che Guevara and Imam Hussein.
The Revolutionary Theology of Martyrdom
Perhaps no concept was more central to Shariati’s revolutionary theology than his reinterpretation of martyrdom. Drawing heavily on the narrative of Imam Hussein’s death at Karbala in 680 CE, Shariati transformed this foundational Shi’ite tragedy into a universal symbol of resistance against oppression.
For Shariati, Karbala was an eternal paradigm for revolutionary action. He popularised the slogan that Khomeini would later adopt: “Every place should be turned into Karbala, every month into Moharram, and every day into Ashura.” This was active emulation, a call for continuous revolution against injustice.
As contemporary analysis suggests, “Martyrdom, in this context, became a revolutionary act, a way for the oppressed to assert their dignity and challenge the status quo”. Shariati had taken a religious concept and transformed it into “a powerful tool for political mobilisation,” one that would prove devastatingly effective in the years to come.
The Suppression and the Silence
The revolutionary potential of Shariati’s ideas was not lost on the Shah’s regime. In 1972, the government closed Husseinieh Ershad and arrested Shariati on charges of advocating “Islamic Marxism.” He spent eighteen months in solitary confinement, during which the regime attempted to discredit him by doctoring one of his unfinished essays, adding crude anti-Marxist diatribes, and publishing it under his name.
Even imprisonment could not silence Shariati’s influence. Tapes of his lectures continued to circulate throughout Iran, inspiring a generation of young revolutionaries. When international pressure, particularly from Parisian intellectuals and the Algerian government, secured his release in 1975, he remained under house arrest until being permitted to leave for England in May 1977.
One month later, on June 18, 1977, Ali Shariati was found dead in Southampton at the age of 43. While British authorities ruled it a heart attack, his supporters immediately suspected assassination by SAVAK, the Shah’s secret police. Recent research by University of Southampton students has shed new light on his final days, revealing that he died at 10 Portswood Park under the name Ali Mazinani, but the circumstances remain controversial. What is certain is that Iran had lost its most influential revolutionary intellectual just two years before the revolution he had done so much to inspire.
The Tragic Irony of Success
The supreme irony of Shariati’s life and death is that while his ideas proved instrumental in mobilising the masses against the Shah, the revolution that followed bore little resemblance to his vision. Shariati had been deeply critical of clerical authority, arguing that religious leaders too often served as instruments of oppression rather than liberation. He envisioned a revolutionary Islam led by enlightened intellectuals, not by traditional clergy.
Yet when revolution came in 1979, it was Ayatollah Khomeini and his clerical followers who emerged victorious, establishing the very kind of theocratic state that Shariati had warned against. As scholar Rebecca Ruth Gould notes, “Shariati’s own vision for Islam diverged in important respects from that propagated by Khomeini and other leaders of the 1979 revolution”. The Islamic Republic that emerged was far closer to Shariati’s “Black Shiism, institutionalised, conservative, and authoritarian, than to the revolutionary, egalitarian “Red Shiism” he had advocated.
The clerical establishment that came to power was well aware of this contradiction. While they appropriated Shariati’s revolutionary symbolism, they marginalised his actual ideas. Many of his works were banned, and his role in the revolution was systematically downplayed. As one observer noted, “Today, only a long street running from the north to the south of Tehran is named after him”, a modest memorial to a man whose ideas had shaken an empire. 1 reply
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1/3 - The Making of a Kingdom: How Britain Created Saudi Arabia and Displaced Islam’s Traditional Guardians
A Historical Investigation into Colonial Manipulation of Sacred Custodianship (1915-1925)
In the winter of 1915, a British political officer named Captain William Henry Shakespear met his death in the Arabian desert, fighting alongside a relatively obscure tribal leader named Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud. Yet Shakespear’s final assessment of his ally would prove remarkably prescient: Ibn Saud, he had written, possessed the potential to become a “British vassal for good”, not merely for the duration of the Great War, but for generations to come.
A decade later, Ibn Saud would rule over Islam’s two holiest cities, Mecca and Medina, having displaced a dynasty that had guarded these sacred sites for nearly a thousand years. This transformation was not the result of tribal warfare or religious awakening, as commonly portrayed, but rather the outcome of one of the most successful colonial manipulations in modern history, the deliberate creation of Saudi Arabia as a British client state.
The Guardians of the Holy Cities
For nearly a millennium before Ibn Saud’s rise, the Hashemite dynasty had served as the hereditary custodians of Mecca and Medina. Their authority rested on unshakeable foundations: direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) through his grandson Hasan, centuries of successful stewardship over the Hajj pilgrimage, and formal recognition by successive Islamic empires.
When the Ottoman Empire incorporated the holy cities into its domain in 1517, it preserved this ancient arrangement. Sharif Barakat, the Hashemite ruler of Mecca, ceremonially presented the keys to the holy cities to Sultan Selim I, symbolising the transfer of ultimate sovereignty while maintaining Hashemite custodianship. This delicate balance between imperial authority and religious legitimacy would endure for four centuries.
The system worked because it satisfied both political and spiritual requirements. The Ottoman sultans could claim the prestigious title of “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques,” while the Hashemite Sharifs retained practical control over the pilgrimage and day-to-day administration of the sacred sites. The arrangement provided the stability and religious credibility essential for governing Islam’s most important cities.
By the early 20th century, Sharif Hussein bin Ali ruled the Hejaz region containing Mecca and Medina as the appointed representative of the Ottoman Sultan. A direct descendant of the Prophet, Hussein embodied the traditional legitimacy that had governed the holy sites for centuries. Yet within a decade, his family would be driven into exile, replaced by rulers whose primary qualification was their usefulness to British imperial strategy.
The British Calculation
When World War I erupted, Britain faced the daunting prospect of fighting the Ottoman Empire while governing millions of Muslims across its own territories. The Ottoman Sultan’s declaration of jihad against the Allies posed a serious threat to British rule in India, Egypt, and elsewhere. British strategists needed Muslim allies who could counter Ottoman religious authority and fragment the enemy’s power base.
In the Arabian Peninsula, three potential partners emerged: Sharif Hussein in the Hejaz, the Al Rashid dynasty in northern Arabia, and Ibn Saud in the central Najd region. Each offered different advantages and complications for British planners seeking to reshape the Middle East.
The relationship with Ibn Saud began almost by accident. Captain Shakespear, the British political resident in Kuwait, had been exploring possibilities for anti-Ottoman alliances when he encountered the Saudi leader in 1914. Despite their brief association ending in Shakespear’s death, the contact established a precedent for British-Saudi cooperation that would prove far more durable than anyone initially imagined.
The formal alliance was cemented through the Treaty of Darin, signed on December 26, 1915, on the island of Tarut in the Persian Gulf. Sir Percy Cox, Britain’s chief political officer in the region, negotiated directly with Ibn Saud to create what amounted to a British protectorate over Saudi territories. The treaty represented a masterpiece of imperial pragmatism, providing Ibn Saud with legitimacy and resources while ensuring British control over his foreign policy.
The Price of Protection
The financial terms of British support were substantial by regional standards. Ibn Saud received an immediate payment of £20,000 upon signing the treaty, equivalent to hundreds of thousands of pounds today, followed by a regular monthly subsidy of £5,000 that continued until 1924. This steady income stream provided the Saudi leader with resources that his rivals could not match, enabling him to maintain larger forces and purchase superior weapons.
But money was only part of the equation. Britain also provided Ibn Saud with arms, ammunition, and crucially, diplomatic protection from Ottoman retaliation. When Turkish forces threatened Saudi territories, British influence helped shield Ibn Saud from the full weight of imperial response. This support proved decisive during the early years when the Saudi state remained vulnerable to external pressure.
The British investment in Ibn Saud reflected a calculated assessment of his potential value. Unlike Sharif Hussein, who harboured grand ambitions for Arab unity under Hashemite leadership, Ibn Saud appeared content with regional dominance and British protection. His interpretation of Islam, influenced by the strict Wahhabi movement, emphasised obedience to legitimate authority, a characteristic that British officials found reassuring in a client ruler.
The Great Betrayal
While cultivating Ibn Saud in central Arabia, Britain simultaneously courted Sharif Hussein through the famous Hussein-McMahon Correspondence of 1915-1916. These letters promised British support for Arab independence under Hashemite leadership in exchange for Hussein’s rebellion against Ottoman rule. The Arab Revolt that followed proved strategically valuable, tying down Turkish forces and disrupting enemy supply lines throughout the war.
Yet even as Hussein’s forces fought alongside British troops, London was secretly negotiating the Sykes-Picot Agreement with France, dividing Ottoman territories between European powers. More significantly, British support for Ibn Saud continued unabated, creating a direct threat to Hashemite power in the Arabian Peninsula.
This duplicitous policy reflected the pragmatic cynicism of imperial strategy. Hussein’s revolt served immediate wartime objectives, but British planners increasingly viewed Ibn Saud as a more reliable long-term partner. The Hashemite leader’s pan-Arab ambitions conflicted with British desires for fragmented, manageable states in the post-war Middle East. Ibn Saud, by contrast, showed no interest in challenging the broader colonial order.
The contradictions in British policy became apparent after the war’s end. Hussein refused to sign the Anglo-Hashemite Treaty, rejecting terms that would have reduced him to a British puppet. His proclamation of the caliphate in 1924, following the abolition of the Ottoman institution, represented a direct challenge to British authority over Muslim populations worldwide.
For British officials, Hussein’s caliphal claim was particularly threatening because of its potential legitimacy. As a descendant of the Prophet and guardian of the holy sites, Hussein possessed religious credentials that could command respect across the Islamic world. His independence made him dangerous in ways that the more compliant Ibn Saud was not.
The Conquest of the Holy Cities
The decisive break came in 1923 when Britain withdrew its protection from Hussein while continuing to support Ibn Saud. This shift in the balance of power had predictable consequences. In 1924, Ibn Saud launched his invasion of the Hejaz, deploying forces that had been equipped and financed through years of British subsidy.
The conquest was swift and brutal. The Ikhwan, fanatical Wahhabi warriors organized by Ibn Saud, captured Mecca in 1924 before laying siege to Jeddah and Medina. Their religious motivation, purifying Islam from what they considered Hashemite corruption, provided ideological cover for what was essentially a British-sponsored takeover.
The fall of the Hashemite kingdom marked the end of nearly a thousand years of traditional custodianship over Islam’s holiest sites. Hussein bin Ali was forced into exile, first to Cyprus under British supervision, then to Transjordan to live with his son Abdullah. The symbolic weight of his fate was not lost on contemporary observers: for the first time in Islamic history, a Sharif of Mecca would be buried outside the holy city he had once ruled.
The human cost of the conquest was largely ignored by Western powers eager to legitimise the new arrangement. The Ikhwan’s methods included the systematic destruction of Islamic historical sites deemed “idolatrous” by Wahhabi doctrine. Tombs of the Prophet’s companions, including his first wife Khadijah, were demolished in an orgy of iconoclasm that erased centuries of Islamic heritage.
The Legitimation Process
Following the Saudi conquest, Britain moved quickly to provide international recognition for the new rulers. The Treaty of Jeddah in 1927 formally acknowledged Ibn Saud’s sovereignty over the Hejaz and Najd, effectively endorsing the displacement of the Hashemites. Other Western powers followed Britain’s lead, creating an international consensus that legitimised Saudi rule over sites sacred to over a billion Muslims. 1 reply
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1/3 - The Abandonment of Binational Palestine: An Examination of Policy Reversal, 1947-1949
Note before getting started: The language presented in this paper reflects the terms used in that era which may be offensive to some readers. For historical correctness, I chose to stick with the terms to get the point across.
Abstract
This research paper examines the significant shift in Anglo-American policy regarding Palestine between 1947 and 1949. Initially, both the administrations of President Harry Truman and Prime Minister Clement Attlee demonstrated support for binational solutions that aimed to secure equal rights for both Palestinians and Jews. However, this stance was ultimately abandoned under sustained pressure from various sources. This study analyses declassified documents and contemporary accounts to investigate the mechanisms through which organised efforts influenced official policy, including appeals to electoral concerns, financial considerations, and political maneuvering.
Introduction
Declassified historical records indicate that President Truman and British Prime Minister Attlee initially favored binational arrangements for Palestine rather than the creation of an exclusively Jewish state, intending to ensure equitable rights for all inhabitants. Their subsequent deviation from this position represents a pivotal policy reversal in modern diplomatic history, with enduring implications for stability in the Middle East.
Truman’s Initial Vision and Subsequent Policy Shift
The President’s Original Stance
Historical scholarship suggests that "as president, Truman initially opposed the creation of a Jewish state. Instead, he tried to promote an Arab-Jewish federation or binational state." This alignment was consistent with foundational American principles of democracy and self-determination, echoing concepts found in Wilson’s Fourteen Points and Roosevelt’s Atlantic Charter, which emphasised democratic governance.
Truman’s approach sought to balance the humanitarian needs of Jewish refugees with the established rights of Palestinians. When the concept of partition became unavoidable, his initial support leaned towards plans that would proportionally divide Palestine based on existing demographics, aiming to provide fair representation for Palestinians within their historic homeland.
Factors Influencing the Policy Shift
Truman himself described the pressure exerted on the White House as unprecedented. This multifaceted influence campaign appears to have involved several coordinated elements:
Financial and Electoral Considerations
Reports suggest that Postmaster General Hannegan informed Defense Secretary James Forrestal that "very large sums were obtained a year ago from Jewish contributors" and that policy "would have a very great influence on raising funds for the Democratic National Committee." Between 1947 and 1948, the White House experienced a substantial communication influx regarding Palestine, including 48,600 telegrams, 790,575 cards, and 81,200 other pieces of mail, indicating a concerted public pressure campaign. Former Undersecretary Sumner Wells stated that "by direct order of the White House, every form of pressure, direct or indirect, was brought to bear by American officials" to secure the partition vote, even in the face of State Department opposition.
Interpersonal Dynamics and Persuasion
Accounts suggest that White House advisor David Niles and others reportedly "burst into tears whenever [Truman] tried to talk to them about Palestine," a tactic that reportedly "disconcerted" the President. Niles is also noted to have "threatened emotionally to resign unless Truman acted more emphatically in support of the Jewish cause."
Administrative and Media Dynamics
Democratic officials expressed concerns about potential losses of Jewish electoral support, and significant financial contributors reportedly threatened to withdraw funding. Campaign strategists reportedly considered advertising campaigns against Democratic politicians who did not align with Zionist demands. Professionals within the State Department who advocated for binational solutions faced systematic career challenges and public criticism, sometimes characterised as anti-Semitic. Coordinated media efforts reportedly framed any support for Palestinian rights as prejudice, thereby potentially constraining open policy discussions regarding alternative democratic structures.
Truman’s Eventual Endorsement and Subsequent Reservations

Under sustained pressure, Truman reluctantly endorsed the partition plan, though he reportedly maintained private reservations. He later conveyed his frustration, writing to a Democratic National Committee official that "the situation is insoluble in my opinion."
Even upon recognising Israel, Truman demonstrated a continued reluctance toward ethnic exclusivity by personally removing characterisations of the new state as specifically "Jewish." He subsequently urged Israeli leadership to engage in negotiations with Palestinians regarding borders and the refugee situation, expressing concern about the handling of the refugee crisis.
British Support for Inclusive Solutions
The Attlee Government’s Position
The British Labour government's opposition to ethnic partition was rooted in both strategic analysis and democratic principles. "The British, who held a colonial mandate for Palestine until May 1948, opposed both the creation of a Jewish state and an Arab state in Palestine as well as unlimited immigration of Jewish refugees to the region."
Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin's stance reflected a careful assessment of regional implications. "He opposed the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine because he was convinced it would have a damaging effect on relations with the Muslims in the Middle East and India as well as affecting Britain’s extensive interests in the region."
The Anglo-American Committee’s Recommendation
Professional analysis supported binational approaches. The Anglo-American Committee unanimously concluded "that there be no Arab or Jewish state" but rather joint governance arrangements that respected the rights of both communities. This consensus reflected the views of career diplomats and regional experts from both governments.
Predictive Assessments
British officials accurately anticipated the potential consequences of ethnic partition. Bevin’s warnings regarding regional destabilisation and the potential for Palestinian displacement proved accurate, as subsequent decades illustrated the inherent instability of exclusivist arrangements.

Mechanisms of Policy Reversal
The shift in official policy appears to have been significantly influenced by financial pressure and the systematic circumvention of professional expertise.

Financial and Political Influence
In 1947, American Zionist organisations reportedly raised $150 million, at the time, the largest charitable appeal in American history, with half of these funds allocated for operations in Palestine. This capital likely facilitated extensive lobbying, electoral pressure, and media campaigns.
Professional Disregard and Intimidation
Career diplomatic and military professionals who advocated for binational solutions reportedly faced systematic intimidation. Defense Secretary James Forrestal is noted to have stated he would "rather lose those states in a national election than run the risks" of abandoning principled Middle East policy. His resistance is said to have contributed to his political marginalisation.
State Department specialists on the Middle East, whose expertise provided insight into regional dynamics, reportedly found their assessments dismissed and their careers threatened when they championed Palestinian rights or cautioned against the implications of partition. Reports suggest a "State Department rebellion," where the department was "openly in rebellion against the President. They considered him an accidental president who had no chance whatsoever of being elected again in 1948. They had no respect for him and his views." The State Department reportedly even prepared a speech to be delivered without Truman’s knowledge, which would have withdrawn support for partition and advocated for a trusteeship.
The Retreat from Trusteeship
When partition proved immediately disruptive, both governments briefly considered reverting to UN trusteeship arrangements designed to protect all communities. However, pressure from Zionist groups reportedly led to the abandonment of even these compromise positions, resulting in a unilateral Israeli declaration of independence and immediate American recognition.
Hidden Details of Influence: "Under the Cover" Operations
Beyond the publicly observable pressures, declassified documents reveal additional, less visible aspects of the influence campaign.
The Inner Circle Dynamics
- David Niles: Identified as a Jewish White House advisor, reportedly linked to Soviet intelligence according to Venona documents. He is noted for coordinating with Jewish Agency officials on "how to penetrate the policy making establishment and neutralise State Department opposition."
- Eddie Jacobson: His involvement was reportedly coordinated by B’nai B’rith leaders Frank Goldman and Dewey Stone. The sequence involved Stone spending a day with Chaim Weizmann in NYC, then confiding in Goldman that night. Goldman then contacted Jacobson in Kansas City, who subsequently traveled to Washington D.C. without an appointment and gained entry to the White House. 1 reply
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