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Ladislaus

@ladislaus

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35 Followers
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Ladislaus
@ladislaus
I placed a bid in the @EFDevcon 7 Ticket Raffle-Auction! Join the raffle here: https://raffle.devcon.org/
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Ladislaus
@ladislaus
Summarised some notes I took during ZuBerlin regarding proposer collateralisation, mostly paraphrasing our discussions with a few annotations. (h/t @mteamisloading for further discussions). https://hackmd.io/@Ladislaus/rJfRYJoB0
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Ladislaus
@ladislaus
I just donated to Web3 Infrastructure on @gitcoin's grantsstack. No more network/bridging/gas fee/passport hassle -> lessons learned💪 Bull market or not, open source projects still remain tricky to monetize from. -> sharing is caring
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Ladislaus
@ladislaus
Quick notes on connecting a remote-signer w/ a validator client (mostly repetitive& well-documented elsewhere) But, w/ Secure-Signer running inside a TEE stakers greatly minimize common slashing risks while (re)staking protocols need to trust NoOps less https://hackmd.io/@Ladislaus/S1NX6tHeA
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Ladislaus
@ladislaus
What if the "ET market", as you call it, would randomly select among "pre-purchasers" of ETs at a posted price? A protocol functionality to refund ET purchasers should be possible anyways, at least for ETs outside the look-ahead/redemption period, I believe.
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Ladislaus
@ladislaus
I have not come across a specific design proposal, yet. Intuitively I'd agree here. Do you refer to such a "mev auction" from a primary sale perspective on the protocol level or do you refer to the secondary market? (or both?)
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Ladislaus
@ladislaus
Have to think about it more, but an overarching design question seems to be if we want the protocol to shield beacon proposers from the overhead of "selling" future blockspace (w/ ETs) or explicitly delegate this task to them (w/ APS-Burn)
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Ladislaus
@ladislaus
Right, I needed to re-hash the bidding&attestation process in the original MEV-burn design, but see your tentative sympathy for APS-burn over ETs clearer now.
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Ladislaus
@ladislaus
Also, there's this neat memetic unfair advantage of permissionless lotteries. Even if one argued ET-pools were to be a thing, I could envision a 'solo-staker gambler guild' purchasing ETs to then only redistribute building rights to either locally build payloads or decentralised builders (suave?).
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Ladislaus
@ladislaus
Great framing of the current APS landscape, thank you for that! When contrasting ETs vs APS-burn it appears to me that you value shielding validators from relays/mevboost completely (w/ ETs) *lower* compared to the abundance of added complexities due to ET (pricing) mechanisms (if APS-burn). Is this a fair assessment?
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Ladislaus
@ladislaus
wrote down a few notes on SGX-capable staking hardware options (adapted for Puffer because of remote attestations allowing for just 1ETH bond requirements) but this is generalisable for anyone interested in staking from a TEE https://hackmd.io/@Ladislaus/Sy9m77ebA
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Ladislaus
@ladislaus
github.com/ultrasoundmoney/docs/blob/main/bid_adjustment.md ultrasound is open & transparent about it relays(&builders) can screw up in many different ways; best-in-class relay performance serves the network in its current form, though Taking a cut from validators for offering a sustainable service appears reasonable
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Ladislaus
@ladislaus
https://twitter.com/sui414/status/1778714390050767196 relay monetisation has been an ongoing issue for a long time (we've seen relays shut down operations bc of it) Not trying to justify the shortcomings of external PBS in general, but competing on performance/latency was always a possible way forward
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Mark
@ethdreamer
🚨 CALLING ALL STAKING POOLS 🚨 We need your feedback! There are still a few outstanding design decisions to be made for EIP-7251. I've written a quick post to get you up to speed. Please provide feedback in the MaxEB Breakout Room next week!! https://hackmd.io/@wmoBhF17RAOH2NZ5bNXJVg/S1U86pzgR
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Ladislaus
@ladislaus
Thanks to all of you for the extensive analyses and for raising awareness. First time I recall a proposal being cancelled (for now) for being a proposal. Burden of proof is on Xitter influencers to convince me that their resistance-to-change is not the only counter-argument.
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Ladislaus
@ladislaus
A highly contested update of Ethereum's economic policy. Some parallels with today are astounding https://supporteip1559.org/
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Ladislaus
@ladislaus
Who here remembers?
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Ladislaus
@ladislaus
We've seen a number of solo stakers in the past being harshly punished with a 1ETH initial hair cut, usually due to setup misconfigurations causing accidental double-signings.
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Ladislaus
@ladislaus
Is it correct that EIP-7251 aka Max_EB will almost entirely remove the initial slashing penalty? maybe @mikeneuder.eth could kindly chime in Would this only apply to consolidated validators or also non-consolidated? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3cVhNXDTjgg
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Ladislaus
@ladislaus
> there is a soft upper bound to solo staking > inst. capital likely is the much bigger reserve for stake supply > lower their risk-adjusted returns through issuance reduction (& anti-correlation incentives) > make them want to *hold* ETH & chase yields beyond the consensus layer
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