Vitalik Buterin
@vitalik.eth
Grats @dankrad @karalabe.eth you got me to interrupt my work on EIPs and make a twitter response that turned into an unscheduled poast 😀 https://vitalik.eth.limo/general/2024/05/17/decentralization.html
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Péter Szilágyi
@karalabe.eth
Thanks. In exchange let meg interrupt my shit-posting to write an EIP (brain-dump) :) https://x.com/peter_szilagyi/status/1791589527452336341
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Vitalik Buterin
@vitalik.eth
It's an interesting proposal! I think the biggest challenge with this kind of approach is intentional "edge attacks" to try to split the network. So, suppose you have X+1 proposer slots in a row. You send a tx right on a slot boundary, and don't include it X+1 times. Half the network thinks your last block is censoring
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Péter Szilágyi
@karalabe.eth
I'm unsure this is an attack though. If I am a malicious validator that try to mess with my own block, I could try and time the propagation to split the network, but the effect is that my block might get reorged out f 50%+ don't attest. If 50%+ does attest, the block remains. But I don't see a split here. 1/2
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Péter Szilágyi
@karalabe.eth
On the other hand, if it's not my block, then my proposal's "mining" order *is* actually the economically rational order. So a rational miner would not include it because it's mandated, but rather because that's what's economically meaningful, independent if they received the tx 12 or 13 or 9 seconds ago. 2/3
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Péter Szilágyi
@karalabe.eth
The initial propagation time before mandates should be large enough to cater for any realistic network latency, but naive/local miners would not mine these transactions because they are mandated, rather because they are economically rational. The only complexity is on MEV where you need to tweak your MEV prio fees.
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