Ethereum

Check out EIP-7918: Blob base fee bounded by execution cost. PFI in Fusaka. A simple if-else ensures the price for target blobs > the tx price to carry them. The blob auction can then reach equilibrium relative to the price signal.

Check out EIP-7918: Blob base fee bounded by execution cost. PFI in Fusaka. A simple if-else ensures the price for target blobs > the tx price to carry them. The blob auction can then reach equilibrium relative to the price signal. https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/eip-7918-blob-base-fee-bounded-by-execution-cost/23271

Observe how execution costs make the demand curve inelastic. A small shift in demand or costs (arrows) can therefore lead to dramatic shifts in the equilibrium blob base fee, bringing it down to 1 wei. The auction cannot function, because supply and demand curves are parallel.

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When demand picks up, the auction mechanism is stuck at too-low fees, intermittently resorting to a first-price auction, considered a worse UX by blob consumers. The resulting spikiness in resource consumption is suboptimal for scaling blobspace.

To alleviate this, the proposal imposes that the equilibrium (squares) forms on the edges of the upper-left quadrant, at the intersection between supply and demand or between fee parity of blobs/tx and demand. The auction mechanism can then function properly.

I think the ACDE today will be a bit busy with other topics, so I will not pitch it there. But if you are a developer thinking that this simple change might be worthwhile for a scaling-focused fork, feel free to reach out! I can answer any questions you may have over the weekend.

https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-7918.md